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摘要 
本文主要處理關於歐盟與中共雙邊關係的武器禁運問題，本文認為，歐盟與中共皆為現
存國際政治體系下興起的兩個強權：歐盟於去年納入中東歐與地中海地區十個新會員國，其
全球政經地位再度提升，而中共由於近年的經濟發展也使其在國際活動空間獲得更高地位。
因此，雙方互動已由雙邊格局提升為全球戰略架構，雙方除在政治、經濟與社會文教各層次
上多有合作空間外，歐盟與中共要求解除武器禁運呼聲日益高漲，因此舉有益雙方進行更高
層次的戰略交往合作，並促進雙邊層次更深的商業與經貿互動。然而，武器解禁又不僅是雙
方互動過程的單純問題，解禁還同時牽涉了歐盟、中共與美、俄等國的交叉互動，以及其對
兩岸穩定狀態的直接介入。對歐盟而言，如果僅僅從戰略與商業利益角度思考歐盟與中共的
雙邊交往，則其不啻為可能的未來兩岸發展埋下更多變數，同時也將因此牽動歐盟與美國、
俄國的互動格局。在此基礎上，本文將分析歐盟為何解禁？美國為何企圖阻止武器解禁？解
禁對歐盟開拓武器市場有何助益？以及歐盟應該如何調整其武器出口政策等，希望能對歐盟
武器禁運問題提供一個較完整面貌。 
Current Issues 
A more comprehensive exchange between the EU and China 
This paper deals with the relationship between the European Union and China. Both are 
emerging world powers. On 1 May 2004, the European Union expanded for the fifth time in its 
history, increasing to 25 members. From the viewpoint of European activists, this expansion will 
lead to changes in world politics. Meanwhile, as China's influence on the world stage grows, it is 
becoming more confident in dealing with international and regional affairs, despite the fact that it 
has serious domestic problems. In this regard, both the EU and China have strong desires to 
cooperate in the international sphere and to protect themselves from the influence of other vested 
interests.  
 
The close economic interaction between the EU and China is worthy of consideration. A 
few key points may help illustrate the comprehensive relationship that has developed between the 
two sides. According to statistical data, trade volume between Europe and China was more than 
US$160 bln in 2004, almost 35 percent higher than the same period in 2003. The growing 
economic interdependence between the EU and China is evident in the fact that the EU has 
surpassed Japan and the US to become China's largest trading partner. China has become the 
second largest trading partner of the EU, second only to the US. Sino-European economic and 
trade ties saw rapid growth last year, pushed by highlevel exchanges between China and Europe. 
These included exchanges between political leaders, such as a visit by the PRC's president and 
premier to the European continent, and official visits to Beijing by political elites from EU 
member states. What's more, social and cultural exchanges across the Eurasian continent also have 
bolstered twoway understanding. As Romano Prodi, then president of the European Commission, 
put it, the EU-China relationship is "at its best in history." Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also said 
recently that he thought the bilateral relationship was enjoying the most active and fruitful period 
in its history. 
 
The desire to construct a more comprehensive relationship has brought an improvement of 
bilateral political exchanges. Nowhere is this more visible than in the EU's moves toward lifting 
the arms embargo. It is hoped that the decision to normalize arms sales to China will lead to a 
mutually beneficial future, not only in the sphere of commercial exchanges, but also in the sphere 
of strategic cooperation. 
 
Bush administration: stop discussions about lifting the arms embargo 
Nevertheless, the EU's and China's intentions to construct a new strategic framework 
inevitably will be influenced by hegemonic power. The Bush administration worries that the EU's 
attitude toward China will pose a potential threat to US strategic deployment in East Asia. The 
aim of US strategic behavior in this area is to consolidate stability and to promote regional 
dialogue, no matter whether it is between China and Taiwan or on Korean Peninsula. The U.S. 
worries that by lifting the arms embargo, the EU could send a vague or wrong signal that the EU 
backs China's aggressive actions against Taiwan. In this context, the Bush administration has 
urged the EU not to lift the embargo, and has even threatened to retaliate if the EU acts alone.  
 
When US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice paid a visit to Beijing on 20-21 March this 
year, she cautioned the EU not to lift the embargo because it would "alter the military balance in a 
place where the United States has very strong security interests," a very clear signal for Brussels. 
Almost simultaneously, the EU summit (European Council) in Brussels expressed a watered-down 
message that the EU probably would postpone consideration of the arms issue, despite the fact that 
it has sought closer ties with China since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.  
 
It is widely recognized that the EU's moves toward lifting the arms embargo as quickly as 
possible have come to a halt because of China's recent adoption of the "anti-secession law." 
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who favors ending the embargo, declared that the 
anti-secession law "has created quite a difficult political environment." Asked whether the law 
would delay action on the embargo, Straw said only that the question "is not on the agenda of the 
European Council."  Discussion of the issue has all but disappeared and it remains uncertain 
whether the EU might bring it up again before June. The EU's current Luxembourg presidency 
recently denied that it has ruled out lifting the embargo before June. It is worth noting that even if 
the ban is not lifted during Luxembourg's EU watch, it could still come up when Luxembourg 
hands over the reins to Britain. Britain seems to be facing an awkward predicament on this issue: 
On the one hand, it has a  tradition of strict adherence to transatlantic cooperation with the US; 
on the other hand, it is also a member of the European Union, and has profound interests within 
both the EU and China. 
 
Arms embargo: strategic and commercialinterests 
Arguments between the EU and US over whether to lift the arms embargo are currently the 
subject of fervent discussions, but a key point is often underplayed or missing from the debate: 
why the EU intends to construct a more comprehensive Eurasian framework. 
 
Most observers concentrate their attention on the importance of the EU-China strategic 
alliance and commercial interests (such as EU arms sales to China). This coincides with a "realist" 
explanation: the Franco-German alliance aims at a multi-polar world; they share common strategic 
interests. On the other hand, they also see the massive potential of the Chinese market. With 
China's emergence as a significant regional entity and a rising power, no major global corporation 
can turn its back on China's vast economic attractions. This is especially significant as the EU's 
defence industry faces increasingly harsh competition in both the domestic and international 
spheres.  
 
Unlike normal commercial activities, the defence industry is currently exempt from 
European market competition rules on the grounds that defence matters are a national security 
issue. When the European Defence Agency (EDA) was formed last July, its main goal was to 
integrate EU member states' separate defence industries into a single, efficient industry to battle 
global competition (especially from the US). The decision to open up Europe's 30 billion euro 
defence market is likely to emerge as part of member state co-operation within the EDA. This idea 
has arisen because of concerns that a lack of competition forces member states to overpay for  
equipment from their own national producers, which leaves them with fewer resources for esearch 
into new technologies. By prodding the EU to look at the Chinese market, the European 
Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) and British Aerospace and Defence giant (BAE) 
hope to have a more prosperous future. Indeed, they have done a good job over the past several 
months in persuading the EU to consider lifting the embargo. 
 
The lion share: EU focuses on Chinese market 
It can be argued that the EU's defence industry's market share in China is was marginal until 
2002, but its prospects is are quite positive. According to a report in The Economist report, the 
volume of China's defence industry will be rise up to as much as 15 billion USD per year in the 
near future (despite the EU's share companies' participation in the Chinese market, in China's 
import they  accounted for only 2.7% of the China's defence trade imports is only 2.7 % in 2004). 
In this context, it is not difficult to imagine understand why France, Germany, British Britain and 
other member states might submit themselves to the vast commercial interests. What is more, the a 
political alliance between the EU and Russia in on this issue is possible when if the lifting of the 
arms embargo looms largebecomes likely. In order to prevent a harsh and vicious competition,  
both the EU and Russia will discourage from selling the sales of core technologies to China. 
 
A more surprising fact is that EU possesses advanced technologies in the sphere of in such 
areas as generators, communications equipment, or night-vision telescopes. With the help of EU's  
technologies, the China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) could easily promote improve their its 
all-weather and digital warfare capabilities. That will would tilt the balance of power across the 
Taiwan-Strait and could even deter the U.S.'s military action in the face of a regional crisis or 
conflict. This is especially crucial when as China becomes more and more confident in dealing 
with Asian affairs and intervenes in cross-strait relations. Consequently, it is very important to 
askthe EU not to lift the arms embargo and to encourage Brussels to come up with a 
morecomprehensive framework for engaging China. That needs some measures.  
時事分析 
Arms embargo: how to re-adjust EU's external behaviors? 
In order to keep EU's arms sell sales intact under at recent levels and to walk a thin line 
refraining from more avoid exacerbatinged transatlantic dissonancetensions, the EU authorities 
have to must take some important measures into account as the lifting of the embargo is 
approachingapproaches. What is more, Aas an emerging and responsible global power in the 
world, Brussels has to  stabilize East Asiathe regional equilibrium in East Asia by prodding 
China and Taiwan to engage in constructive dialogue and by encouraging both sides to strictly 
adherence not to avoid military competition.  
 
First, the EU should revise its "Code of Conduct" concerning on arms sellsales. It should 
lay put more emphasis on the promotion of human rights and democracy. Until recently, the four 
countries under EU's arms embargoes were: China, Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe. , are  All 
are notorious for their strict controls on freedom of expression and other political powers. The EU 
should win the allegiance of the world by treating countries equally and without discrimination. If 
China's notorious continues to ignore human rights performance and strict control on constrain 
freedom of speech and political rights exist, the European Union should not be subject to ignore 
Chinese pressure and react. On the contrarythe other hand, if the Chinese government makes 
remarkable headway in democratic processd evelopment, Brussels should bolster up this 
tendencyrespond with encouragement. In addition, the EU's new instrument on measures 
pertaining to arms exports to post-embargo countries should also be presented. 
 
Second, the arms embargo is important in as much as because any military modernization 
enabled by the sales will tilt the region's balance in China's favor. The international community 
should urge Brussels to construct a transparentcy method in for arms sales so that EU members 
and other concerned countries would have the opportunities to could object to a potential sales to 
China or other non-democratic countries. A wWellfunctioninged communication and transparent 
linkage among member states concerning on arms sell sales could consolidate the EU's common 
stance and prevent member states from vying for China's favor. What is more, like as German 
foreign minister Joshka Fisher and other leaders have said, a possible confrontation looms large 
between US and China in East Asia. The EU would be forced to take a positionsides if China and 
the US have a strategic clash. The EU should caution take care not to push the US-EU-China 
triangularle relationship too hard in this regard.  
 
Third, the EU should respect Taiwan's international status and support further democratic 
development on Taiwan further democratic development. EU statements about the need for 
announcement on regional stability is are a necessary buttress for Taiwanese de facto 
independence; without a stable environment Taipei would would be unable to sustain fail to 
achieve a sincere the democratic process. Since "civilian power" is a hallmark of the EU's 
international role is hallmarked by the concept of "civilian power" and since the EU also has 
relative profound interests in East Asia, ; Brussels should reassert the importance of peaceful  
resolution and of constructive dialogue across the strait.  
 
